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Abstract
This paper examines the determinants of internal migration in a context where wages tend
to be rather inﬂexible at a regional scale so that regional labor demand shocks have a prolonged
impact on employment rates. Regional income diﬀerentials, then, reﬂect both regional pay and
employment diﬀerentials. In such a context, migrants tend to move to regions that best reward
their skills in terms of both of these dimensions. As an extension to the Borjas framework, the
paper thus hypothesizes that regions with a low employment inequality attract more unskilled
workers compared to regions with unequal employment chances. By estimating a migration model
for the average skill level of gross labor ﬂows between 27 German regions, we ﬁnd evidence in
favor of this hypothesis. While rising employment inequality in a region raises the average skill
level of an in-migrant, higher pay inequality in a region does not have a signiﬁcant impact on the
average skill level of its in-migrants. A higher employment inequality in Eastern as compared
to Western Germany may, thus, be the missing link to explain the fact that East-West migrants
tend to be rather unskilled.
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Since German reuniﬁcation, there have been concerns that East Germany experiences a brain drain,
thereby losing an important regional asset for job creation and economic growth.1. A major reason
to believe that migrants from Eastern to Western Germany may be positively selected with respect
to skills can be derived from the Borjas model on the self-selection of immigrants (1987). According
to this framework, skilled workers should be attracted to regions that best reward their abilities by
paying high returns to their skills as reﬂected in a high variance of the wage distribution. With
the wage variance in Western Germany exceeding Eastern levels, we would thus expect east-west
migrants to be positively selected, although the convergence in the relative wage inequality that
has been found by Burda and Hunt (2001) and Gernandt and Pfeiﬀer (2008) points towards a
reduced relevance of this selection mechanism. Empirical evidence for the 1990s suggests that East-
West migrants are disproportionately skilled in terms of observable and unobservable skills (Burda
and Hunt 2001, Hunt 2000, Bruecker and Truebswetter (2007)). In contrast, Granato and Niebuhr
(2009) present evidence that the net migration rate of unskilled migrants even exceeds that of skilled
migrants after 2000, a ﬁnding that contradicts the idea that the selection mechanism is solely based
on regional diﬀerences in wage inequality.
One underlying reason for a wage-based selection mechanism to fail could be that central wage
bargaining in Germany prevents a ﬂexible wage adjustment at the regional level as has been found
by Topel (1986) for the US. Consistent with this ﬁnding Möller (1995) and Mertens (2002) show
that wages in Germany do not exhibit any reaction to regional labor demand shocks which therefore
tend to have a prolonged impact on regional employment rates. Similar results have been found for
Europe by Decressin and Fatas (1995) and Abraham (1996). In such a context, modeling the migra-
tion decision as a wage-maximizing process may be inadequate since income diﬀerentials that drive
migration decisions may result from employment rather than wage diﬀerentials. Not surprisingly,
therefore, empirical tests of the Borjas framework perform rather poor in the German context (Arntz
2010, Brücker and Trübswetter 2007) compared with studies by Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992)
and Hunt and Mueller (2004) that demonstrate its relevance for internal migration in the US. Hence,
1For studies on the eﬀect of human capital on growth see for instance Fratesi and Riggi (2007) and Kanbur and
Rapoport (2005).
1in a context with regional wage rigidities, we need to base the analysis of migrant selectivity on an
extended framework in the manner of Harris and Todaro (1969) that allows for regional diﬀerences
in employment chances.
This paper therefore suggests that skill-speciﬁc regional employment chances may be a missing
link to fully explain skill-selective migration in a context where wages are rather inﬂexible at a
regional scale. In particular, we argue that workers choose regions that best reward their skills in
terms of both employment chances and wages. For unskilled workers, for example, we hypothesize
a self-selection into regions with a low employment inequality. This prediction results from the
assumption that employment inequality is a measure of the returns to skills in terms of employment.
We consider this a plausible assumption since unskilled individuals are the ones who are most prone
to unemployment (Möller and Schmillen 2008, Reinberg and Hummel 2007, Boockmann and Steﬀes,
2010). This unemployment risk may reﬂect that unskilled individuals are more likely to be atypically
employed than their skilled counterparts (Giesecke, 2009). Moreover, ﬁrms tend to hoard skilled
rather than unskilled labor during economic downturns (Nickell and Bell, 1995). In line with such
arguments, Mauro (1999) ﬁnds that adverse regional shocks increase unemployment mainly among
unskilled workers. Thus regions with a high employment inequality penalize unskilled workers and
should thus attract predominantly skilled workers.
Therefore, this paper contributes to the literature by extending the Borjas framework to allow for
a selection mechanism based on both wage and employment diﬀerentials. This model predicts the
average skill level of a migration ﬂow to be a positive function of the wage and employment inequality
in the destination as compared to the origin region. Moreover, unlike the Borjas framework, the
model predicts that mean wage and employment diﬀerentials also induce a positive skill sorting. The
second contribution of the paper thus is to test the predictions of this extended migration model for
the average skill level of gross labor ﬂows between 27 German regions. For this purpose, we make use
of the full sample of the employment register data in order to be able to determine the skill content
for each of these ﬂows with regard to both observable and unobservable skills. We then regress these
skill measures on the mean and the dispersion of the regional wage and employment distribution.
Thus, instead of only conditioning on the regional unemployment rate as is done is most migration
models, we capture not only the average risk of being unemployed, but also allow regions to diﬀer
2in how this risk is spread among the local workforce. As a third contribution to the literature, we
are able to exploit the panel dimension of our data. Rather than estimating the self-selection of
migrants based on a cross-section only, we are able to include a ﬁxed eﬀect for each labor ﬂow,
thus conditioning on average time constant utility diﬀerentials between two regions (e.g. amenity
diﬀerentials) that may otherwise bias the estimation results.
The ﬁndings suggest that, as expected, the average skill level of a migration inﬂow increases with
the dispersion of employment chances in the destination compared to the origin region. Moreover,
mean diﬀerentials in wages and employment also tend to increase the average skill level of a labor
ﬂow, while the wage dispersion has no signiﬁcant impact. Apparently, the high skill level of an
average West-East migrant and the relatively low skill level of an average East-West migrant may
partially be attributed to the poorer employment chances for unskilled relative to skilled workers
in Eastern compared to Western Germany. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2
proposes an extended theoretical framework for the self-selection of migrants. Section 3 describes
the data base and the deﬁnition of the covariates used for the subsequent analysis. Section 4 presents
descriptive evidence on gross migration ﬂows in Germany as well as on the distributions of both wages
and individual employment chances. The section also includes a discussion of German East-West
Migration. Section 5 describes the estimation strategy for the empirical analysis and presents the
ﬁndings together with several robustness checks for the estimations of the extended migration model.
Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
Our theoretical framework builds upon Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992) who formalize the self-
selection of interstate migrants and test their model in the US context. Their framework is linked
to the self-selection of workers as described by Roy (1951) and the extension of this approach to
the self-selection of immigrants as developed by Borjas (1987). However, while the latter approach
focusses on the selection based on unobservable abilities, Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992) focus on
the selectivity of internal migrants with respect to both observable skills and unobservable abilities.
Our framework extends their theoretical model by allowing for unemployment. As a consequence,
migration decisions do not depend on diﬀerentials in regional wage distributions alone, but also hinge
3on the probability of receiving this wage, i.e. the probability of being employed as has already been
discussed by Todaro (1969). As a consequence, diﬀerentials in regional income distributions that
reﬂect both the employment and the wage distribution aﬀect migration decisions and the selectivity
of internal migrants.
Consider j = 1;:::;J regions that only diﬀer with respect to the income distribution. For ease
of exposition, our theoretical framework thus abstracts from other utility diﬀerentials between re-
gions such as regional amenities or disamenities including regional price diﬀerentials.2 An income-




with j as the income in region j which is the product of the probability of being employed ej on any
particular workday in region j and the wage wj paid in this region if employed. Now assume, analog
to Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992), that the population wage distribution can be decomposed into
a part reﬂecting the mean wage w that is independent of an individual’s skills and abilities and
a part that measures person-speciﬁc deviations from this mean wage that depend on individual i’s
skills i and the returns to skills paid in region j. We assume that skills and abilities are perfectly
transferable between all regions, an assumption that we consider justiﬁed for internal migration.3
The population wage distribution in region j can then be written as
wj = wj + wj; (2)
where  is considered as a continuous random variable with mean zero and an unlimited range over
the real numbers that reﬂects the region-invariant skill distribution of all skills and abilities. An
individual’s potential wage is thus determined by his position in the skill distribution and the region-
speciﬁc returns to these skills wj. We further assume an analog decomposition of the population
employment distribution which can be written as
ej = ej + ej; (3)
2Our empirical approach controls for time-constant regional diﬀerentials and thus takes account of much of these
utility diﬀerentials.
3While this assumption may be unproblematic with Western and Eastern Germany, it is less clear whether the
assumption can be applied to migration across the former German border since East German skills have partially
been depreciated after re-uniﬁcation. We will thus run some sensitivity analysis in section ??.
4with ej as the average probability of employment on an average workday and  as deﬁned above.
Hence, an individual’s employment probability is determined by the average employment probability
and the region-speciﬁc returns to his skill level in terms of employment ej. Typically, migration
models only consider interregional diﬀerences in average employment chances by using the regional
unemployment rate as a corresponding indicator. The disadvantage of this approach is that it only
tells us something about average employment chances and nothing about how the risk of being out of
work is spread across the local workforce and especially across diﬀerent skill groups. The literature
suggests, however, that unqualiﬁed individuals are more prone to unemployment, especially in the
last two decades. Bynner and Parsons (2001) show for the U.K., for example, that contrary to older
cohorts, the lack of certain qualiﬁcations signiﬁcantly increases the incidence of unemployment by
about 30% among younger cohorts born in the 1970s. Consistent with these ﬁndings, Möller and
Schmillen (2008) ﬁnd that the unemployment incidence is much higher among unqualiﬁed individuals
in Germany and that the share of individuals who are at risk of being unemployed is increasing
among younger cohorts. Similarly, Wilke (2005) ﬁnds skilled individuals to be much less prone to
unemployment than their unskilled counterparts. All these ﬁndings are in line with a theoretical
model developed by Helpman at al (2010) that suggests that the unemployment rate is decreasing
in worker ability, whereas the average wage is increasing in worker ability. In light of the literature,
we therefore assume that unskilled workers are situated at the bottom of the distribution of both
wages and employment.
If we thus apply the two decompositions in equation (2) and (3), the income in region j can then be
written as
j = (wj + wj)  (ej + ej)
= wjej + (ejwj + wjej + wjej) (4)
= Mj + Rj (5)
where the ﬁrst term Mj corresponds to the average income in region j, and the second term Rj
reﬂects all region-speciﬁc returns to skills.4 The returns to migration thus diﬀer across skill groups,
4Note that, analog to Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992), we assume relative prices of all skills to be region-invariant
so that we do not have to operate with a multifactor model of ability.
5thereby inducing a sorting of individuals into regions that best reward their particular skills. In
particular, the utility diﬀerential between region j and k can be written as
Ujk = j   k = Mj   Mk + (Rj   Rk) (6)
and thus depends on an individual’s skills and abilities. The utility diﬀerential now depends on the
parameters of the wage and employment distribution in both regions. Note that changes in average
employment and average wage level aﬀect the mean diﬀerential as well as the diﬀerential in the
returns to skills. The partial eﬀect of increasing average employment and average wages in j can
thus be written as
@Ujk
@wj
= ej + ej and
@Ujk
@ej
= wj + wj: (7)
Therefore, individuals will be rewarded by an increasing average wage to the extent that the indi-
vidual is employed in region j. While region j becomes more attractive for all potential migrants,
skilled individuals with a higher  gain the most from an increasing mean wage so that the migration
ﬂow from k to j should become more skilled on average. The same argument can be applied to an
increase in the average employment probability. While all potential migrants beneﬁt from such an
increase by reaching higher income levels, the gain is more pronounced the higher is the wage an
individual receives for each additional day employed. For high-skilled individuals, this gain should
thus exceed the gain for less-skilled individuals so that the migration ﬂow from k to j should again
become more skilled on average. Note that the opposite predictions hold for increases in the average
wage and employment in region k.
Changes in the returns to skills in terms of both wages and employment chances only aﬀect the




= (ej + ej) and
@Ujk
@ej
= (wj + wj): (8)
An increasing wage inequality will thus attract skilled individuals with a positive  who can expect
to beneﬁt from the increasing returns to skills to the extent that they are employed in region j. In
contrast, individuals with a below average skill level will experience an income and thus utility loss
6if wage inequality increases. The skill composition of the migration ﬂow from region k to j should
thus get more skilled on average if either wage inequality or employment inequality increases.
Note that we have J(J  1) migration ﬂows and thus any comparative static should take account of
all the parameters in the model, i.e. the employment and wage distributions in each region. However,
the partial eﬀects derived in equation(7) and (8) can be considered to reﬂect the predictions of the
model holding all other parameters in all other regions constant. In our later estimation approach,
we will have to ensure that such a ceteris paribus condition holds.
In addition, three further issues warrant a short discussion. First of all, we neglect the case that
any of the regions is unpopulated. Thus, we assume each region to make a competitive oﬀer to at
least some individuals. Thus, for any three regions j   1;j;j + 1 that are adjacent in terms of their
returns to skills with Rj 1 < Rj < Rj+1, region j can only exist if the mean income in region j
satisﬁes
Mj >
(Rj+1   Rj)Mj 1 + (Rj   Rj 1)Mj+1
Rj+1   Rj 1
: (9)
If mean incomes where the same across al regions, all skilled individuals would prefer the region
with the highest return to their skills whereas individuals lacking these skill would be attracted to
regions with the lowest penalty from lacking these skills. Thus, a region that ranks in the middle
in terms of the returns to skills can only exist if it oﬀers a competitive mean income level that
exceeds the mean income level in at least one of the neighbors. The existence condition thus rules
out cases where the relationship between the mean income M and the returns to skills R is ﬂat or
even inversely U-Shaped, but allows for a monotonously decreasing or increasing as well as for a
U-shaped relationship. While this does not diﬀer from the insights in Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo
(1992), the extended model suggests an important derivation. In particular, unlike the simple wage-
based framework, the relationship between w and w can be inversely U-shaped as long as the
relationship between e and e makes up for it by a U-shaped relationship. The extended model
thus implies that a region can compensate a disadvantage in terms of its wage distribution and thus
ensure its existence by a favorable employment distribution and vice versa.
Secondly, it may be helpful to discuss the reasons why we expect ﬂows in opposing directions to
7exist. This may be the case because there are new cohorts entering the labor market each period
among which a certain share are likely to be mismatched to their origin region in terms of their skills.
Thus, while the most able individuals will leave their region for regions with a higher returns to their
skills, less-skilled individuals may prefer the opposite direction in order to minimize the penalty from
lacking skills. Moreover, individuals for whom a particular region once oﬀered the optimal return
to their skills need not be optimally matched forever if individuals shift their position in the skills
distribution due to training eﬀects or due to the depreciation of skills.
Finally, the model abstracts from a number of potential complications such as regional amenity
diﬀerentials, price diﬀerentials as well as from migration costs. As long as these components are not
correlated to the skill level, the key results remain unchanged. However, there are reasons to believe
that migration costs decrease in abilities if abilities facilitate the gathering of information and reduce
the psychological costs of migration. If this is the case, the key results of the theoretical model remain
unchanged only conditional on such costs. Similarly, if individuals diﬀer in how they value certain
regional amenities and disamenities depending on their skill level as has been argued by Glaser et al.
(2005), the key results also remain intact only conditional on regional diﬀerentials in amenities and
disamenities. Our estimation approach thus needs to take account of these complicating factors.
3 Data
In the previous section we derived clear empirical predictions about the relationship between regional
diﬀerences in the returns to skills and the resulting direction and skill composition of migration ﬂows.
In order to test these predictions, we analyze the employment register data (BeH) of the German
Federal Employment Agency. This administrative data set contains information on the population
working in jobs that are subject to social insurance payments, thus excluding civil servants and self-
employed individuals. We are thus able to reconstruct individual employment histories including
periods of employment and periods of unemployment beneﬁt receipt on a daily basis. For each
employment spell, the data contains individual and ﬁrm-level characteristics including the daily
gross wage, the educational attainment as well as the micro-census region of the workplace. We are
thus able to identify gross labor ﬂows rather than migration ﬂows between regions by comparing
workplaces before and after an interregional job transition. Though the restriction to labor ﬂows is a
8shortcoming, the data set is the only data set in Germany that allows for observing wages, skill levels
and interregional moves on the basis of a large sample. Moreover, our theoretical predictions should
be applicable to labor ﬂows as well, although our results should not be interpreted as reﬂecting
general migration ﬂows in Germany. The sample is restricted to the time period between 1995-2004,
since for the years before 1995 no reliable information on the workplace relocation between East and
West Germany is possible. Furthermore, we focus on men between the age of 16 and 65 because
women’s lower labor force attachment would aggravate the selectivity of the sample used for the
analysis.5.
For all subsequent analyzes, we distinguish between 27 aggregated planning districts.6 These regions
lump together 97 German planning districts (’Raumordnungsregionen’) that are deﬁned according to
commuting ranges and thus already comprise labor market regions that are relatively self-contained.
In order to ensure a suﬃcient number of job moves between each of these regions for diﬀerent
skill levels, we further aggregate these planning districts to 27 larger regions. We do so based on
an algorithm that reduces the remaining external commuting linkages, thereby ensuring that the
regional division still reﬂects relatively self-contained labor markets.7 For each of these 27 regions
we estimate the key explanatory variables, namely the returns to skills reﬂected be the employment
and wage distribution, for each year during the observed time period. Altogether, the 27 regions
result in 702 gross labor ﬂows whose size and skill composition we calculate for each year and region.
The following subsection discusses the corresponding details.
3.1 Data on Level and Skill-Composition of Interregional Labor Flows
For the computation of interregional labor ﬂows, we exploit information on the entire working
population, i.e. we use the full employment register data (BeH) that is only available to researchers at
the Institute for labor Market Research (IAB). For the computation of labor ﬂows, we use yearly cross
sections to the cut-oﬀ date June 30th and compare the workplace location between two consecutive
years. We are thus able to calculate the gross labor ﬂows by identifying the origin and the destination
5We exclude men attending military or civilian service since they are centrally registered so that the identiﬁcation
of their exact location is not possible and neglect apprentices and all employment spells with minor employment, since
its deﬁnition changed in 1999.
6For a map and a complete list of regions see Figure ?? and Table ?? in the appendix.
7Details on the algorithm is available from the authors upon request.
9region for all interregional job moves. Note that the identiﬁcation of an interregional job move
necessitates an individual to be employed on June 30th of two consecutive years. While the sample
may thus include individuals who have been unemployed between these two cut-oﬀ days, long-term
unemployed are clearly underrepresented in our data, a shortcoming that we have to be aware of
when discussing our estimation results.
We then calculate the average skill level of each gross labor ﬂow by constructing three alternative
measures. The ﬁrst measure corresponds to the average years of completed education among the
movers of each labor ﬂow. This measure reﬂects part of the diﬀerences in observable skills across
labor ﬂows. The calculation of the second and third measure is based on ranking individuals in the
predicted and residual wage distribution. The underlying idea is that wages reﬂect the marginal
product of labor and may thus proxy for abilities and skills.8 More precisely, following the approach
by Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992), we estimate daily gross wages9 with the following Fixed-Eﬀects
(FE) model for all individuals in the sample:
log wijt = 1REGIONit + 2Y EAR + 3Xit + "ijt (10)
where wijt is individual i’s daily gross wage in region j and year t. The wage is a function of
a vector of dummy variables indicating the workplace location (REGION), a vector of dummy
variables indicating the year of the observation (YEAR), a vector of control variables (X). The control
variables include all observable characteristics that aﬀect an individual’s level of productivity such as
age, age squared, occupation (8 categories), industry (10 categories), establishment size, educational
attainment (six levels) and tenure, deﬁned as the number of working years in the current company.
The control vector also includes a dummy for part-time employment, because we do not observe
hourly wages, but only daily wages that may diﬀer between fulltime and part time employees due to
diﬀerent working hours. We thus use the available information on part time employment to control
for such diﬀerences. The error term "ijt depends on the match between workers and regions. By
8Ideally, we would rank individuals according to their income residuals. However, we are not able to estimate the
income distribution for the full BeH data because the data is reduced to a cross-section that lacks information on
the previous employment history. Extending the data to include the full employment history is impossible due to the
resulting size of the data.
9Unfortunately, around 15% of all wages are top-coded at the contribution limit of the social security. Therefore,
we impute the censored wages with an estimation procedure described by Gartner (2005). This procedure adds a
randomly drawn error term to the predicted wage level and thereby avoids a strong correlation between the error term
and the explanatory variables.
10assuming that the individual’s skill level is region-invariant, the error term can be written as
"ijt = j(i + uit); (11)
where i comprises the remaining stock of unobservable person-speciﬁc characteristics, j refers to
the region-speciﬁc returns to human capital and uit denotes a random error term. Equation (11)
thus states that the error term is proportional to j. When estimating the model in equation (10)
after demeaning at the individual level, the average residual of an individual thus reﬂects i as long
as the regional dummies capture j. In other words, identiﬁcation of the i comes from individuals
moving between regions and receiving a wage that is proportional to the region-speciﬁc returns to
their region-invariant skills and abilities.
Based on this approach, we deﬁne two wage-based measures for the skill content of each labor ﬂow.
The ﬁrst measure is based on the predicted wages of equation (10). For this we calculate the average
predicted wage among the movers of each labor ﬂow which corresponds to the number of standard
deviations that their wage is above or below the mean wage due to deviations in observable abilities.
We call this measure the “observed” skill measure. The second measure is based on estimating
equation (10) without any controls in X. An individual’s average position in the resulting residual
wage distribution, i, then reﬂects unobservable and observable skills that are time-constant. By
computing the average of these individual ﬁxed eﬀect for all migrants following a particular migration
path, we get a measure of the overall skill content of each ﬂow. We call this measure the “overall
” skill measure.
We are thus able to analyze three measures of the skill content of each labor ﬂow which reﬂect either
of the following three only: years of completed education, observable skills and overall skills including
both observable and unobservable skills. Note that we have the corresponding skill measures for each
labor ﬂow on a yearly basis so that we can exploit the panel dimension in the subsequent analysis. In
addition, we calculate the number of movers for each labor ﬂow per quintile of the skill distribution
according to the observed and unobserved skills measure as well as for each of the six education
groups, in order to compare the skill structure of each labor ﬂow in more detail.
113.2 Data on Regional Returns to Skills
The theoretical model presented in Section 2 implies that the sorting of skills across regions is largely
determined by the region-speciﬁc returns to skills parameters Rj. According to the theoretical model,
the region-speciﬁc returns to skills are reﬂected by the mean and dispersion of the regional wage and
employment distribution. Since we distinguish between movers observable and unobservable skills,
we need to construct appropriate regional returns to skills measures that takes this into account.
3.2.1 Regional Wage Distribution
For the regional mean wage we calculate the average predicted wage of the regional workforce that
results from separate region- and year-speciﬁc OLS-regressions of equation (11). By estimating this
model separately across years and regions, we allow for diﬀerent returns to observable characteristics
across space and time. For the regional wage dispersion we construct two diﬀerent measures. As a
ﬁrst measure, we compute the standard deviation of the predicted wages for the regional workforce
reﬂecting region- and year-speciﬁc returns to observable skills only. This measure of wage inequality
should be able to explain the selectivity of migration with respect to observable skills. In order to
explain the selectivity of labor ﬂows with regard to the overall skill content, we simply use the wage
variance at the regional level.
3.2.2 Regional Employment Distribution
For the regional employment distribution we construct similar measures. For this purpose, we ﬁrst
compute the number of days a worker is employed during a year based on the two percent random
sample of the employment register data that contains full spell information on periods of employment
and unemployment.10 While the regional mean and the regional variance of the days employed can
be used as a measure to explain the skill selectivity of labor ﬂows with regard to overall skills,
we again need a second measure that reﬂects returns to observable characteristics only. For this
10One problem is that for periods of unemployment without receipt of income, transfers from the German employ-
ment agency are not identiﬁable (see Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2010, and Lee and Wilke, 2009 for more details). Using
the institutional setting in Germany, we deﬁne unemployment by all periods of nonemployment after an employment
period which contain at least one period with income transfers by the German federal labor oﬃce (for more details
see Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010)’s deﬁnition of ’nonemployment’.) Furthermore, we weigh part-time jobs according
to their amount of hours worked. In particular, we weigh days, where part-time work with more than 18 hours, by
0.6 and those with less than 18 hours with 0.25.
12purpose, we need to estimate a model of the number of days employed as a function of observable
characteristics. Note, however, that the number of days employed during a year comes with mass
points at 0 and 365 employed days. We thus need to take account of this inconvenient distribution
by modeling the diﬀerent cases separately.
Let Iijt = 0;1;2 denote an individual-speciﬁc indicator function that depends on the number of days
individual i is employed during a particular year t in region j, dijt:
Iijt =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
2 if dijt = 365
1 if 0 < dijt < 365
0 if dijt = 0
In turn, individual i’s expected number of employed days depends on the probability of being
employed all-year-long (Iijt = 2), between 0 and 365 days (Iijt = 1) and all year long (Iijt = 0).
According to the law of total probability, individual i’s conditional expected employed days in region
j at time t can be written as follows:
E[dijtjXit] = P(Iijt = 1jXit)E[dijtjIijt = 1;Xit] + P(Iijt = 2jXit)E[dijtjIijt = 2;Xit] (12)
where the conditional probabilities P(Iijt = 0jXit), P(Iijt = 1jXit) and P(Iijt = 2jXit) add up to
unity. Note that E[dijtjIijt = 0] = 0 and E[dijtjIijt = 2;Xit] = 365. We calculate equation (12)
for each region and year using predicted values of the conditional probabilities that are estimated
within a multinomial logit framework.11 The conditional expected values E[dijtjIijt = 1;Xit] are
predicted within region- and year-speciﬁc OLS-regressions. For the construction of the employment
dispersion we again construct two diﬀerent measures. As a ﬁrst measure we calculate the standard








ijtjXit]   (E[dijtjXit])2 (13)
Equation (13) then captures region- and year-speciﬁc returns to observable skills only. Arguing
similarly as above, the higher are the rewards to observable skills characteristics in a region in terms
of higher expected days employed, the higher is the dispersion of predicted employed days in such a
region. As a second measure we calculate the dispersion of employment residuals. For this we ﬁrst
11We thereby assume that the assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is fulﬁlled.










Equation (14) then reﬂects region- and year-speciﬁc returns to unobservable skills only.
Thus, we receive wage- and employment-based region- and year-speciﬁc returns to skills that reﬂect
either returns to observable or unobservable skills. These regional returns to skills measures will
serve as explanatory variables in the following estimations of a gross migration model.
4 Descriptives
As we have derived from the theoretical framework in section 2, diﬀerences in the skill composition
of gross migration ﬂows may be explained by interregional diﬀerences in the regional returns to
skills that are reﬂected by both the wage and the employment distribution. The present section
provides corresponding descriptive statistics on migrants average skills characteristics, the size and
skill composition of labor ﬂows in Germany as well as on the regional returns to skills across labor
market regions. The statistics aim to show that their exists large variation in the skill content of
labor cross ﬂows as well as in the regional returns to skills across regions, a fact that we want to
exploit in our empirical analysis.
Table 4 shows means and standard deviations for movers, stayers and for the total amount of workers
of the sending region. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. The values are mean values across
the entire 10 year time period between the years 1995-2004. The table shows that, compared to
the previous year, on average 2.61 percent of a region’s labor force relocate to another labor market
region. In total we are able to analyze 3.55 million job moves during the observed time period.
According to Tabel 4 an average migrant has 8 months more completed education compared to
an average stayer. Furthermore, looking on wage-based skill measures shows that migrants are a
positive selection with regard to observable skills, i.e. the predicted wage of an average migrant
is 0.26 log points higher compared to stayers. The result is in line with other studies on the self-
selection of migrants based on observable skills characteristics as for instance the study by Cutillo
and Ceccarelli (2010). However, migrants are a negative selection with respect to unobservable skills
14Table 1: Means and Variables of Movers and Stayers
Variable Movers Stayers All
Movers (in percent) 2.61 97.39 100
(.01) (.01) (0)
Skill measures:
Years of education 13.1 12.4 12.42
(.4) (.32) (.32)
All skills .005 -.029 -.028
(.103) (.092) (.092)
Unobservable skills -.277 -.068 -.074
(.248) (.234) .234)
Observable skills 4.73 4.471 4.478
(.284) (.29) (.29)
Selected observable human capital characteristics:
Log daily wage 4.46 4.4 4.4
(.14) (.17) (.17)
Age 37.05 39.95 39.88
(.89) (.81) (.8)
Parttime workers (in percent) 2.01 3.15 3.12
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Percent of workers with..
no educational degree 7.58 11.67 11.57
vocational training degree 55.97 65.69 65.44
high school degree .7 .67 .67
high school degree and vocational training degree 4.49 2.97 3.01
technical college degree 5.92 4.14 4.18
university degree 10.28 5.82 5.93
Percent of workers in age group..
15<age<=21 1.46 2.27 2.25
21<age<=25 7.92 6.3 6.34
25<age<=35 40.14 29.21 29.5
35<age<=45 30.57 30.77 30.77
45<age<=65 19.91 31.44 31.14
Sample size (in 1000) 3,550 133,381 136,931
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis.
15Table 2: Cross-Correlations of Average Skill Measures of Gross Labor Flows
Variables Obs. skills Unob. skills All skills Years of
education
Observable skills 1.000
Unobservable skills -0.798 1.000
Overall skills -0.181 0.714 1.000
Years of education 0.212 0.191 0.641 1.000
characteristics, i.e. holding constant all observable characteristics, migrants earn 0.21 log points
less than stayers. The latter may also be explained by the fact that a movers’ decision to relocate
is often caused by a company’s shutdown. Moreover, in the empirical literature it has often been
stated that sorting based on observable and unobservable skills need not go in the same direction
(Dostie and Leger, 2009). Overall, the results suggest that migrants in Germany are a positive
selection in observable terms of the population sending region . However, within groups with similar
characteristics, migrants constitute a negative selection in unobservable terms.
Table 2 reports cross-correlations between all skill measures of migration ﬂows that we have con-
structed. The table shows that the wage-based skill measure capturing overall skills, i.e. both
observed and unobserved skills, is highly correlated with average years of education and the average
unobservable skills measure. Both measures thus seem to capture the overall skill content of labor.
Furthermore, Table 2 shows that the observed wage-based skills measure is negatively correlated
with the unobserved measure of skills.
Tables 7 and 8 in the appendix show average out- and in-migration rates, absolute size of out-
and in-migration and corresponding average skill levels for the entire time period 1995-2004. The
tables show substantial interregional variation in the size and skill-composition between labor market
regions. In particular, East-German regions have thus been loosing many of their low educated
workers during the observed time period. The result is in line with Granato, Haas, Hamann, and
Niebuhr (2009) who study East-West migration during the time period 2000-2006 and ﬁnd that net
migration rates of low qualiﬁed workers are higher than net migration rates of high qualiﬁed workers.
Table 3 shows average and dispersions of both wages and employment of all 27 labor market regions.
For a regional map see Figure 6 in the appendix. For instance, in region 2, on average, 255 thousand
16Table 3: Averages and Dispersions of Regional Wages and Employment across 27 Labor Market
Regions in Germany
Region Average Average Average. Wage Employment
Population daily wage employment dispersion dispersion
(in 1000) (in Euro) (in days) (in Euro) (in days)
East German Regions
2 255 59.9 284.9 1.46 127.36
7 176 60.5 283.2 1.44 130.73
8 876 71.3 290 1.59 129.57
16 371 59.6 294.6 1.44 121.33
17 384 61.5 286.9 1.47 129.61
18 530 60.3 294.4 1.47 122.79
Mean East 432.0 62.2 289.0 1.5 126.90
West German Regions
1 258 80.7 308.6 1.47 116.08
3 605 90.6 319.4 1.56 108.13
4 411 83.3 312.1 1.47 113.11
5 431 83.4 327.3 1.43 97.72
6 561 88.5 314.7 1.49 113.2
9 461 85.4 324.5 1.43 101.59
10 446 88.3 311.3 1.47 118.11
11 1082 92 314.3 1.52 115.08
12 714 92.5 321.1 1.54 107.85
13 336 83.4 324.5 1.42 100.96
14 445 82.6 320.2 1.43 105.79
15 933 97 329.1 1.57 97.72
19 615 90.4 322.9 1.5 105.15
20 318 86.4 332.6 1.43 91.47
21 751 99.3 333.5 1.51 92.13
22 342 88.4 335 1.45 87.21
23 537 89.3 333.9 1.47 90.86
24 422 86.9 326.8 1.51 97.03
25 456 80.7 327 1.42 91.4
26 294 90.5 331.4 1.45 92.61
27 699 98.7 333.7 1.59 89.12
Mean West 529 88.5 324.0 1.5 101.5
17individuals participate in the labor market. The average daily gross wage of these workers is 60
Euros and their average number of days employed is 285 days. The dispersion of daily wages is 1.45
Euros and the dispersion of days employed is 127 days. Table 3 shows large variations in wages
and employment within and between East and West Germany. In particular, average daily wages
and average employed days are higher in West as compared to East Germany. However, the average
wage dispersion is similar in East and West Germany and hardly shows any regional variation. The
result is in line with Burda and Hunt (2001) and Gernandt and Pfeiﬀer (2008) who ﬁnd evidence
in favor of a convergence in the relative wage inequality between East and West Germany. In
contrast, the dispersion of days employed varies markable between and within both parts of the
country. In particular, East German regions show high levels of employment dispersion compared
to West German regions. The result is in line with Grotheer and Struck (2005) who ﬁnd a lower
employment stability in East compared to West Germany. Thus, while markable regional diﬀerences
in the dispersion of employment chances exist, regional diﬀerences in the dispersion of wages are
less pronounced in Germany. The result suggests that a wage-based selection mechanism might not
explain the large variation of migration selectivity that we observe. Rather, the descriptives suggest
an employment-based selection mechanism might explain the diﬀerences in the skill composition
across interregional labor ﬂows in Germany.
Table 4 shows all 7020 gross labor ﬂows ranked according to their average overall skill level as well
as corresponding standardized interregional returns to skills characteristics. The idea is to see if
ﬂows with high average skill content are those ﬂows where the regional returns to skills are higher
in the destination region compared to the region of origin, as theory suggests. For this we create
quintiles of a ﬂow’s average overall skill level and distinguish ﬂows between and within East and
West Germany. In this spirit, the ﬁrst quintile in column one of Table captures the average skill
level and corresponding interregional returns to skills of the 10 percent less qualiﬁed labor ﬂows
within West Germany. In contrast, the ﬁfth column in Table describes the 10 percent best qualiﬁed
labor ﬂows within West Germany. According to Table , migrants among the ﬁrst quintile of West-
West ﬂows are on average 0.05 standard units less skilled in terms of observable and unobservable
skills compared to average workers in the region of origin. In terms of unobservable skills only,
an average migrant among this ﬂow is 0.32 standard units less skilled compared to natives in the
18Table 4: Labor Flows Ranked According to Their Overall Skill Level and Corresponding Regional
Returns
Average log wage residuals Standardized interregional diﬀerences
with regard to: in the regional returns to skills:
Quintile All Unobservable Years of Average Average Wage Employment
of Selectivity skills skills education wage employment dispersion dispersion
West-West Flows
1. Quintile -0.05 -0.32 0.51 -0.16 0.03 -0.38 -0.09
2. Quintile 0.03 -0.23 0.91 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.02
3. Quintile 0.08 -0.17 1.18 -0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.04
4. Quintile 0.13 -0.11 1.43 0.07 -0.01 0.20 0.05
5. Quintile 0.21 -0.02 1.68 0.12 -0.02 0.20 0.07
West-East Flows
1. Quintile -0.22 -0.48 0.40 -2.35 -2.13 -0.46 1.85
2. Quintile -0.15 -0.40 0.68 -2.29 -2.06 -0.37 1.70
3. Quintile -0.10 -0.34 0.89 -2.16 -1.83 -0.11 1.50
4. Quintile -0.04 -0.25 1.16 -2.06 -1.95 0.03 1.62
5. Quintile 0.07 -0.15 1.74 -1.81 -1.98 0.62 1.73
East-West Flows
1. Quintile -0.06 -0.44 -0.44 2.02 2.35 -0.23 -2.19
2. Quintile -0.00 -0.37 -0.20 2.09 2.15 -0.04 -1.90
3. Quintile 0.04 -0.30 -0.12 2.19 1.95 0.12 -1.60
4. Quintile 0.08 -0.24 0.14 2.24 1.83 0.28 -1.42
5. Quintile 0.17 -0.13 0.61 2.12 1.67 0.16 -1.27
West-West Flows
1. Quintile -0.04 -0.16 0.06 -0.65 -0.03 -1.33 -0.15
2. Quintile 0.02 -0.10 0.12 -0.02 0.02 -0.08 -0.04
3. Quintile 0.05 -0.09 0.24 0.17 0.05 0.32 0.02
4. Quintile 0.09 -0.03 0.36 0.22 0.01 0.47 0.04
5. Quintile 0.14 0.03 0.47 0.28 -0.05 0.59 0.13
Note: All average skill levels are relative to the population in the region of origin.
19region of origin. Furthermore, migrants among this ﬂow have on average 0.51 years more completed
education compared to natives in the region of origin. For each quintile Table also shows standardized
interregional returns to skills, i.e the standardized value in the destination minus the standardized
value in the region of origin. Looking for instance again at the ﬁrst quintile of all West-West ﬂows,
i.e. the lowest qualiﬁed ﬂows within West Germany, shows that the average daily wage and the
wage dispersion are 0.16 and 0.38 standard units lower in the destination region compared to the
region of origin. Moreover, while average employment is 0.03 standard units higher, the employment
dispersion is 0.09 standard units lower in the destination compared to the region of origin. Overall,
Table shows that ﬂows in the ﬁrst quintile of selectivity, i.e. the 10 percent ﬂows with the lowest
average skill level, were ﬂows where regional returns to skills in terms of wages and employment were
higher in the destination compared to the origin region. In contrast, ﬂows in the ﬁfth quintile of
selectivity, that is the 10 percent ﬂows with the highest skill level were ﬂows where regional returns
to skills were lower in the destination region compared to the origin region. The descriptive results
therefore suggest, the higher the interregional employment dispersion, average wage and average
employment, the higher is the average skill level of a labor ﬂow. In the following section we will test
this hypothesis.
5 Empirical Analysis
Our main attempt is to identify the determinants of a migrants’ average skill level. We do so by
exploiting the panel dimension of the data that is given by the variation of skill-compositions across
7020 gross labor ﬂows that we observe during the time period 1993-2004. Since an Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression would be biases due to unobserved eﬀects such as utility diﬀerentials
(e.g. amenity diﬀerentials) that are very likely correlated with regional wages and employment, we
estimate the following Flow-Fixed-Eﬀects model:
Sijt = 0 + 1RETURNSojt + 2NATIONALt + oj + ojt; (15)
where t = 1;:::;10 and k 6= j. The dependent variable Sijt is the measure of migration ﬂows’ average
skill level. The term RETURNSkjt is a set of regional covariates that contains all interregional
diﬀerences in regional returns to skills. The latter contains the average values of both wages and
20employment as well as the wage and employment dispersion of a region. The regional characteristics
are statistically standardized interregional values. A value of one for the interregional mean wage,
for example, thus means that the mean wage is one standard deviation higher in the destination
compared to the origin region. Furthermore, we control for national values of the regional returns
NATIONALt. The above model thus controls for time-constant utility diﬀerentials.
Table 5: Estimating the Average Observable Skill Level of Labor Flows with Flow-Fixed Eﬀects
(1) (2) (3)
Migration Observable Observable Skills
Rate Skills (relative to region
(per 1000) of origin)
Interregional values:
Mean wage 0.147* 0.006 0.014
(2.36) (0.34) (0.81)
Mean employment 0.174*** 0.025*** 0.048***
(15.13) (7.62) (14.86)
Wage dispersion 0.062** 0.013 0.030***
(2.64) (1.89) (4.57)
Employment dispersion 0.106*** 0.021** 0.024***
(4.54) (3.10) (3.68)
National values:
National employment -0.229*** -0.002 -0.009
(-7.91) (-0.25) (-1.16)
National wage 0.034 0.163*** 0.002
(1.93) (32.30) (0.43)
National wage dispersion 0.040* 0.100*** -0.005
(2.46) (21.72) (-1.16)
National employment dispersion -0.317*** 0.004 -0.020*
(-10.89) (0.52) (-2.41)
Constant 1.004*** 4.735*** 0.257***
(263.82) (4378.97) (242.39)
N 7020 7020 7020
R sq. 0.137 0.902 0.051
t-statistics in parentheses
* p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:001
Table 5 shows the results for estimations of (1) the migration rate (per 1000 workers in the origin
region), (2) the average observable skill level of labor ﬂows as well as (3) the average observable
21Table 6: Estimating the Average Overall Skill Level of Labor Flows with Flow-Fixed Eﬀects
(4) (5) (6)
Overall Skills Overall Skills Years of
(relative to region education
of origin) (relative to region
of origin)
Interregional values:
Mean wage -0.016 0.024* -0.233**
(-1.50) (2.32) (-3.18)
Mean employment 0.022*** 0.010 0.209***
(4.18) (1.82) (5.64)
Wage dispersion 0.004 0.001 0.128***
(1.02) (0.15) (4.44)
Employment dispersion 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.181***
(5.31) (5.05) (5.12)
National values:
National employment -0.020*** -0.014** -0.019
(-4.07) (-2.98) (-0.55)
National wage -0.065*** -0.045*** -0.092***
(-21.43) (-15.25) (-4.36)
National wage dispersion 0.021*** 0.028*** 0.131***
(7.46) (10.20) (6.85)
National employment dispersion -0.007 -0.004 0.008
(-1.36) (-0.87) (0.22)
Constant 0.013*** 0.041*** 0.869***
(20.06) (63.86) (193.66)
N 7020 7020 7020
R sq. 0.390 0.114 0.033
t-statistics in parentheses
* p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:001
skill level relative to the origin region. The results of model (1) for absolute migration can be
interpreted as follows: a one standard unit increase in the interregional mean wage increases absolute
migration by 147 migrants. Column one shows that all interregional characteristics have a positive
and signiﬁcant eﬀect on migration levels, with the eﬀect of employment being stronger. The result is
in line with Parikh and Leuvensteijn (2002) and Decressin (1994) who ﬁnd that both unemployment
diﬀerences and wage diﬀerences are important factors in determining migration levels.
22Furthermore, model (2) shows that a one standard unit increase in the interregional mean wage
increases the average observable skill level, i.e. the predicted log wage level of an average migrant,
by 0.025 log points. According to model (2) a higher interregional value of both mean and dispersion
of employment increases the average observable skill level of a labor ﬂow, while the wage dispersion
has no eﬀect. However, model (3), where the dependent variable is the average observable skill level
relative to the region of origin, indicates also a positive eﬀect of in crease in the interregional wage
dispersion as Borjas et. al. (1992) suggest.
Table 6 shows estimations of (4) the overall skill level, (2) the overall skill level relative to the region
of origin as well as (3) average education years relative to the region of origin. Note that again in
all estimations on the employment dispersion has a positive eﬀect on the average skill level. Also,
in model (2) and (6) average employment has a positive eﬀect. Thus, the results suggest that a
higher interregional diﬀerence in the average and dispersion of employment chances increases the
average skill level of a migration ﬂow. In contrast, we ﬁnd only weak evidence for a positive eﬀect on
selectivity of a higher interregional wage dispersion. Tables 5 and 6 also shows the eﬀects of national
values of both the wage and employment distribution. In 4 out of 5 models a higher national wage
dispersion has a positive eﬀect on the average skill level of a migration ﬂow. The reason may be
that a higher national wage dispersion may increase the risk of a low-skilled worker that migration
pays of. In particular, institutions such as welfare beneﬁts and other protection laws may further
decreases incentives for low-skilled workers to migrate in such an environment.
6 Conclusion
This paper examined the determinants of skill-selective internal migration in Germany in light of an
extended framework for the self-selection of migrants. The extension hypothesized that self-selection
in Germany may be driven by interregional diﬀerentials in the dispersion of individual employment
chances rather than by the typically suggested interregional diﬀerentials in wage dispersion. The
analysis is motivated by repeated hints in the existing literature that the scope for regional wage bar-
gaining and thus interregional wage diﬀerentiation may be weak in labor markets that are dominated
by central wage bargaining.
23The ﬁndings suggest that, as expected, the average skill level of a migration inﬂow increases with the
dispersion of employment chances in the destination compared to the origin region. Moreover, mean
diﬀerentials in wages and employment also tend to increase the average skill level of a labor ﬂow,
while the wage dispersion has no signiﬁcant impact. Apparently, the high skill level of an average
West-East migrant and the relatively low skill level of an average East-West migrant may partially
be attributed to the poorer employment chances for unskilled relative to skilled workers in Eastern
compared to Western Germany. Thus, this paper suggests, that the Borjas framework needs to be
complemented by a selection mechanism that works via the employment side of the labor market in
order better understand the self-selection of internal migrants in context where where wages tend
to be rather inﬂexible at a regional scale. These ﬁndings are relevant beyond Germany whenever
regional wage rigidities prevent ﬂexible wage adjustments, especially among unskilled workers, and
thus generate skill-speciﬁc interregional disparities in employment chances.
Besides the theoretical implications, the present work is relevant for the understanding of labor
mobility of unskilled workers in countries where increased global competition has forced ﬁrms and
companies to increasingly make use of ﬂexible employment instruments such as temporary and
part-time employment as well as labor leasing. The reason is that unskilled workers are mostly
aﬀected by such nonstandard employment relations. The chances that migration pays oﬀ for unskilled
workers therefore deteriorate and create a barrier to migrate. Therefore, an increasingly instable
environment may even worsen the chances of unskilled workers as regional mobility constitutes
a chance for workers to ﬁnd a new or more stable job nationwide in the present of local labor
market tightness. Policy makers should take this into account when designing policy instruments to
encounter inequalities in light of a transition to a more ﬂexible labor market.
As a further contribution, we are able to better explain the self-selection of migrants between East
and West Germany. Looking at migration rates, we ﬁnd that East-West migrants tend to be un-
skilled, while West-East migrants tend to be rather skilled. The results somewhat calm down the
current debate on the feared brain drain from the Eastern to the Western part of the country. Ap-
parently, East-German regions are not falling behind in attracting human capital into their regions.
Moreover, the present analysis sheds light on the determinants of East-West migration selectivity.
The results suggest that the pattern of East-West migration may partially be attributed to the higher
24employment instabilities in Eastern compared to Western Germany. In particular higher shares of
nonstandard contracts in East compared to West Germany may explain why predominantly unskilled
workers are distracted from East-German regions, while skilled workers seem to be unaﬀected by a
more instable employment environment.
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28Table 7: Out-Migration Rates and Average Skills of Out-Migrants
Region N Rate Av. educ. Obs. skills Unobs. skills All skills
(in 1000) (per 1000)
East German Regions
2 74 1.11 12.8 4.77 -0.48 -0.15
7 69 1.49 12.65 4.74 -0.46 -0.16
8 213 0.93 13.31 4.67 -0.26 -0.02
16 116 1.2 12.68 4.73 -0.45 -0.16
17 149 1.49 12.63 4.69 -0.41 -0.16
18 138 1 12.8 4.72 -0.42 -0.14
Mean East 759 1.20 12.81 4.72 -0.41 -0.13
West German Regions
1 62 0.93 13.41 4.8 -0.36 0
3 164 1.04 13.52 4.68 -0.14 0.1
4 90 0.84 13.04 4.72 -0.3 -0.01
5 104 0.92 13.19 4.74 -0.29 0.01
6 127 0.87 13.56 4.72 -0.21 0.08
9 96 0.8 13.19 4.76 -0.29 0.04
10 157 1.35 13.41 4.71 -0.2 0.08
11 323 1.15 13.53 4.66 -0.11 0.12
12 201 1.08 13.84 4.71 -0.18 0.1
13 81 0.93 13.01 4.74 -0.3 0
14 111 0.95 13.34 4.76 -0.32 0.01
15 258 1.06 13.86 4.7 -0.13 0.13
19 138 0.86 13.61 4.72 -0.22 0.07
20 79 0.96 13.08 4.79 -0.36 0
21 169 0.87 13.64 4.74 -0.2 0.1
22 66 0.75 13.39 4.79 -0.33 0.03
23 110 0.79 13.7 4.76 -0.25 0.08
24 100 0.91 13.57 4.75 -0.23 0.08
25 90 0.76 13.01 4.78 -0.39 -0.04
26 78 1.02 13.12 4.77 -0.3 0.03
27 186 1.02 13.89 4.73 -0.19 0.12
Mean West 133 0.95 13.42 4.74 -0.25 0.05
29Table 8: In-Migration Rates and Average Skills of In-Migrants
Region N Rate Years of Observable Unobservable All skills
(in 1000) (per 1000) education skills skills
East German Regions
2 57 0.84 13.32 4.59 -0.38 -0.1
7 57 1.25 13.06 4.56 -0.37 -0.11
8 182 0.8 13.79 4.61 -0.23 0.02
16 94 0.97 13.01 4.55 -0.37 -0.12
17 119 1.18 13 4.55 -0.35 -0.11
18 117 0.84 13.27 4.56 -0.36 -0.09
Mean East 104 0.98 13.24 4.57 -0.34 -0.09
West German Regions
1 62 0.93 13.42 4.78 -0.35 0
3 181 1.15 13.55 4.77 -0.21 0.09
4 93 0.87 13.13 4.72 -0.3 -0.01
5 107 0.95 13.02 4.75 -0.3 0.01
6 131 0.9 13.54 4.74 -0.22 0.08
9 98 0.82 13.07 4.78 -0.29 0.03
10 168 1.45 13.15 4.65 -0.16 0.06
11 310 1.1 13.42 4.73 -0.15 0.1
12 207 1.11 13.61 4.77 -0.22 0.07
13 83 0.95 12.83 4.76 -0.31 0
14 104 0.9 13.25 4.73 -0.3 0
15 283 1.16 13.73 4.81 -0.19 0.1
19 134 0.84 13.49 4.78 -0.25 0.06
20 87 1.05 12.9 4.85 -0.38 -0.01
21 176 0.9 13.46 4.85 -0.27 0.07
22 73 0.82 13.16 4.84 -0.34 0.01
23 120 0.86 13.41 4.81 -0.29 0.05
24 103 0.93 13.42 4.78 -0.24 0.08
25 97 0.82 12.92 4.77 -0.35 -0.02
26 87 1.14 13.09 4.84 -0.33 0.02
27 219 1.2 13.77 4.91 -0.28 0.08
Mean West 139 0.99 13.30 4.78 -0.27 0.04
30